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1. A prior version of this note that analyzed the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s withdrawn
2004 Badillo opinion, and from which this current note was adapted, won the 2004-2005 Gene
and Jo Ann Sharp Award for Outstanding Case Note.
2. See Jeffrey E. Thomas, Crisci v. Security Insurance Co.: The Dawn of the Modern Era
of Insurance: Bad Faith and Emotional Distress Damages, 2 NEV. L.J. 415, 420 (2002) (noting
that 1930 marks one of the earliest insurance bad faith cases on record).
3. Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation, 25
SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 112 (1994).
4. See infra Part II (discussing three decades of Oklahoma bad faith cases that have failed
to solidify a lasting legal standard).
5. Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 2005 OK 48, 121 P.3d 1080 (per curiam).
6. Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 2004 OK 42, withdrawn, 2005 OK 48, 121 P.3d 1080.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court originally decided the case in favor of the insurance company
in a five-four decision.  Interestingly, the year between the issuance of this first opinion and the
current opinion saw the retirement of two justices who dissented in the original opinion —
Justices Hodges and Boudreau — and the appointment of Justices Taylor and Colbert.
Nevertheless, this change in personnel did not seem to affect the final outcome.  Badillo II’s
majority garnered a six-three vote, including those of both new Justices as well as two votes
from Badillo I’s majority — Justices Lavender and Summers.
7. Any future references to “Badillo” in this note refer to the final, 2005 opinion —
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A Tarnished Golden Rule — Why Badillo v. Mid Century
Insurance Co. Demands Further Clarification from the
Oklahoma Supreme Court Regarding the Tort of Bad Faith1
I. Introduction
For at least three quarters of a century, insurance companies have battled the
legal monster of bad faith.2  Simply stated, society demands insurers to be on
their best behavior when dealing with customers who have faithfully paid their
premiums, developed expectations of being cared for, and are now suffering
some degree of misfortune.  As generally understood, when insurers play the
bully instead of the loving parent or friend, the law should empower their
policyholders  to recover in tort for the relevant bad actions.3  Nevertheless, the
quest for the appropriate legal standard by which to judge an insurer’s
behavior has been fraught with confusion and dissent.4  Oklahoma’s
jurisprudence in this area is no exception.
On June 22, 2005, the Oklahoma Supreme Court wrote the final chapter in
the saga of Badillo v. Mid Century Insurance Co.,5 issuing an opinion on
rehearing that withdrew the court’s one-year-old ruling in the same case.6  The
turnaround was dramatic.  Where Badillo I offered a groundbreaking
perspective on bad faith that insulated insurance companies, Badillo II
performed an ostensible “about-face,” bestowing on insurers increased duties
to meet to avoid liability.  Most importantly, in its final form,7 Badillo
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denoted as “Badillo II” in this portion of the text only to distinguish the subsequent opinion
from the opinion released in 2004 and later withdrawn. 
8. This term refers to the universal maxim of treating others as you want to be treated,
stemming from sources such as Jesus Christ’s exhortation to “[d]o for others what you would
like them to do for you.”  Matthew 7:12 (New Living Translation).
9. Badillo, ¶ 26, 121 P.3d at 1092.
10. Id. ¶ 28, 121 P.3d at 1094.
11. STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS: LIABILITY AND DAMAGES 1-3 (1997).
12. Id.
appeared to seriously depart from the analytical framework of past opinions,
infusing unfamiliar variables into the bad faith debate.  Specifically, the
majority described bad faith in terms of the insurer violating a fiduciary duty
to its insured — a duty the court further defined by a “Golden Rule”8 analysis
that asked only whether the insurance company treated the insured as if it was
standing in the insured’s position.9  Further, the Supreme Court added the
unhelpful guidance that a bad faith violation of this fiduciary duty occurs when
the insurer’s behavior amounts to something more than negligence but less
than reckless disregard of the insured’s interest.10
This note suggests that Badillo ultimately produced a fair result, yet one
established through flawed and potentially harmful reasoning. First, Part II
offers a brief overview of the tort of bad faith and discusses the principal
Oklahoma cases leading to Badillo, focusing specifically on the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the requisite culpability for bad faith.  Second, Part
III explains the case itself, highlighting the relevant facts and rationale from
the majority and concurring opinions.  Finally, Part IV asserts that Badillo
inappropriately handled the issue of bad faith in three critical and distinct
ways — by failing to address and distinguish clear precedent concerning the
elements of bad faith, by establishing an inapplicable standard for identifying
bad faith centered on the abstract principles of the “Golden Rule” while
neglecting to define the requisite mental culpability, and by undermining the
predictability of written contracts between insurers and their insureds.
II.  Toward Badillo: A Journey Through Ambiguity
A. Historical Origins
The tort of bad faith originates in the contract law principle that every
contract imposes on the parties an implied duty to deal fairly and in good
faith.11  In interpreting this legal principle, courts have described good faith as
“refrain[ing] from doing anything that would injure the right of the other party
to receive the benefits of the agreement.”12  With the growth of automobile
sales in the 1900s — and with it the explosion of injury-causing accidents —
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss1/6
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13. Id. at 1-2.
14. Id. at 1-3.
15. Id. at 1-4.
16. 1935 OK 587, 46 P.2d 916.
17. Id. ¶ 20, 46 P.2d at 919.
18. Id. ¶ 12, 46 P.2d at 918.
19. 1977 OK 141, 577 P.2d 899.
20. The distinction between first- and third-party bad faith is an important one in most
states.  A third-party claim generally arises out of two situations: either the insurer is accused
of not defending its insured in a lawsuit where the insured has injured a third party, or the
insurer fails to settle with the third party on the insured’s behalf.  Dominick C. Capozzola, First-
Party Bad Faith: The Search for a Uniform Standard of Culpability, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 181, 184
(2000).  A first-party claim, however, involves an insured’s claim that its insurer unjustifiably
the relationship between insurer and insured became a focal point for the
application of good faith principles.13  Inarguably, the insurance contract
remains unique.  Although the parties may appear to be equal bargainers at the
time of contract formation, the insured becomes unequally dependent upon the
insurer to “make good” when tragedy strikes.14  Faced with the contract law
limitations that restrict recovery to the value of the contract, most state courts
have recognized a remedy in tort for an insured that suffers distress and
financial strain from an insurer’s unjustified denial of a policy claim.15
In 1935, Oklahoma first recognized the insurer’s duty to act in good faith,
along with the potential liability to the insurer beyond the provisions of the
contract.  In Boling v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,16 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that a lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff-insured’s claim of bad
faith constituted error where evidence existed that the insurer failed to act
according to “honest judgment and discretion” in denying payment of a
claim.17  The court framed the debate concerning the mental culpability
required for bad faith by unequivocally stating that the tort is “a thing apart
from self-interest, and renders unnecessary consideration of the [facts] based
on negligence.”18  Thus, bad faith in Oklahoma began as a remedy not to
punish negligent, unreasonable behavior, but to punish behavior that included
at least some level of subjective intent.
B. Christian and Modern Bad Faith in Oklahoma
Relying on Boling and its early companion cases, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court established the modern bad faith standard in 1977 with Christian v.
American Home Assurance Co.19  Cited as the analytical starting place for bad
faith in nearly every Oklahoma judicial opinion over the last twenty-five years,
Christian extended the already recognized tort of bad faith in third-party
situations into the context of first-party claims, seemingly providing a uniform
standard for bad faith claims of all types.20
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withheld payment of a policy where no third party is involved, that is, where injury occurs due
to fire or other natural hazard.  Id. at 185.  Most states have long recognized bad faith in the
third-party context, viewing the insurer as the insured’s fiduciary, who maintains a heightened
responsibility to protect the insured’s expectations.  Id.  To establish bad faith in the first-party
context, most states require the insured to prove a higher level of mental culpability because no
issues of agency exist.  Id. at 196-205 (discussing the different standards applied by states such
as Wisconsin, Arkansas, Mississippi, and New Mexico).
21. Christian, ¶ 4, 577 P.2d at 900.
22. Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 577 P.2d at 904 (internal quotation omitted).
23. Id. ¶ 1, 577 P.2d at 900 (emphasis added).
24. Id. ¶ 3, 577 P.2d at 900.
25. Id. ¶ 4, 577 P.2d at 900.
26. Id. ¶ 6, 577 P.2d at 901.
Christian involved a disability insurer’s refusal to pay a claim and the
disabled-insured’s attempt to recover damages in excess of the policy limits
for emotional distress and punitive damages.21  In explaining the tort of bad
faith, the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued its famous holding that:
[W]hen the insurer unreasonably and in bad faith withholds
payment of the claim of its insured, it is subject to liability in tort.
We approve and adopt the rule that an insurer has an implied duty
to deal fairly and act in good faith with its insured and that the
violation of this duty gives rise to an action in tort for which
consequential and, in a proper case, punitive, damages may be
sought.22
The court’s dual requirements of unreasonableness and bad faith suggested
to the legal community that bad faith was something wholly separate from
reasonableness in the negligence context.  Interestingly, the court began
discussing possible recovery under the bad faith theory with the question of
“whether under Oklahoma law an insurance company may be subjected to
liability in tort for a willful, malicious and bad faith refusal to pay a valid
insurance claim.”23  This characterization was supported by the fact that,
throughout the entire trial and appellate process, the defendant-insurer offered
zero explanation for its denial of the insured’s claim.24  Emboldened by these
facts, the court went on to adopt the language of the plaintiff-insured’s brief,
again identifying the tort as “willful and malicious.”25  When the court later
stated that “[t]he essence of the cause of action is bad faith,”26 this description
arguably included a strong component of sinister motive — or at least reckless
disregard, as demonstrated by the insurance company’s lack of any rational
explanation for its actions.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol59/iss1/6
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27. 1981 OK 128, 637 P.2d 583.
28. Id. ¶ 21, 637 P.2d at 587.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Richard J. Harris, The Subjective Elements of Insurer Bad Faith Claims, 75 OKLA. B.J.
2317, 2326 (2004).
31. 1982 OK 97, 653 P.2d 907.
32. Id. ¶ 25, 653 P.2d at 914.
33. Id.
34. Id. ¶ 23, 653 P.2d at 914.
35. Id. ¶ 25, 653 P.2d at 914-15.
In 1981, two years after Christian, the Oklahoma Supreme Court considered
McCorkle v. Great Atlantic Insurance Co.,27 stating that “the intentional tort
of bad faith . . . is the insurer’s unreasonable, bad faith conduct . . . .”28  After
first implying the presence of an intentional, subjective component in its bad
faith analysis, the court appeared to confuse the issue, stating that “if there is
conflicting evidence from which different inferences may be drawn regarding
the reasonableness of insurer’s conduct, then what is reasonable is always a
question to be determined by the trier of fact . . . .”29  Assuming that the court
intended the legal community to take these terms at face value, one rational
explanation for the apparent conflict in simultaneously applying a subjective
and objective standard could be that the terms “intentional” and “reasonable”
are not mutually inconsistent.  Rather, the court potentially recognized a
hybrid between negligence and intent that some have called “subjective
unreasonableness.”30
C. Timmons and the Growing Confusion
In the 1982 decision of Timmons v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.,31 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court continued to grapple with the Christian dual-
requirement standard.32  Although the earlier case of McCorkle appeared to
infuse components of motive into bad faith, the Timmons court expressly
rejected this view, choosing instead to focus on the objective unreasonableness
of the insurer’s actions.33  The Timmons court addressed the insurer’s
complaint that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury with an
instruction that defined the term bad faith as “an actual existing evil intent to
mislead or deceive [that] does not include a misstatement made through
inadvertence or carelessness.”34  Without further explanation, the court replied
that “[t]he trial court did not err in refusing the requested instruction because
to limit recovery for Christian-type actions to ‘an actual existing evil intent to
mislead or deceive’ limits recovery substantially beyond that required for
proof of failure to deal fairly and in good faith.”35
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36. Id. ¶ 23, 653 P.2d at 914.
37. Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions-Civil, Instruction 22.3, in VERNON’S OKLAHOMA
FORMS (2d ed. West 2003) [hereinafter OUJI 22.3].
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Jan Bissett & Margi Heinen, What Is the Law? - Finding Jury Instructions, Nov. 15,
2000, http://www.llrx.com/columns/reference19.htm.
41. 1984 OK 25, 681 P.2d 760.
42. Id. ¶ 8, 681 P.2d at 761.
43. 1989 OK 128, 782 P.2d 1357.
44. Id. ¶ 8, 782 P.2d at 1360.
With this one statement, the court ended its analysis.  Notably, the holding
stopped short of expressly defining bad faith by the “inadvertence or
carelessness” language mentioned in the insurer’s proposed instruction.36
Nevertheless, by closing the door to the “purposefully malicious or evil”
concept, the Timmons court moved the frame of reference for bad faith further
toward negligence and its accompanying standard of reasonableness.
This apparent departure from the early Boling pronouncement that bad faith
required more than neglignce, a concept Christian reiterated, was most clearly
shown in the adoption of Timmons as the “leading case” explaining
Oklahoma’s current jury instruction.37  Assuming the typical contractual
relationship between an insured and insurer, Oklahoma Uniform Jury
Instruction (OUJI) 22.3 requires the plaintiff to prove three elements of bad
faith by a greater weight of the evidence: (1) that the insurer’s actions were
unreasonable, (2) that the insurer did not deal fairly and in good faith, and (3)
that the insurer’s failure to deal in good faith resulted in harm to the insured.38
Following these three requirements, the uniform instruction offers “Notes on
Use” and “Comment” sections, the latter citing Timmons as the primary
interpretation of the good faith standard.39  Consequently, the Oklahoma legal
community has at least in part been forced to recognize Timmons and its
objective view of bad faith because of its place of preeminence in the court’s
default jury instruction — a document assumed to most clearly represent the
law.40
Nevertheless, in the years following Timmons, it became clear that bad faith
had yet to find a home among any conventional definitions.  In the 1984 case
of Manis v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,41 the court identified bad faith as the
“intentional tort” recognized in McCorkle, yet dismissed the plaintiff-insured’s
claim because “the insurer’s conduct in withholding payment of the claim was
reasonable.”42  Five years later in Conti v. Republic Underwriters Insurance
Co.,43 the court once again identified McCorkle as the governing law, but made
no mention of bad faith as an “intentional tort,” stating instead that “[t]he
essence of the tort . . . is the unreasonableness of the insurer’s actions.”44  By
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45. 1991 OK 127, 824 P.2d 1105.
46. Id. ¶ 14, 824 P.2d at 1109.
47. Id. ¶ 5, 824 P.2d at 1108.
48. Id. ¶ 30, 824 P.2d at 1112.
49. 2003 OK CIV APP 62, 77 P.3d 1090.
50. Id. ¶ 45, 77 P.3d at 1099.
51. Id. ¶ 38, 77 P.3d at 1098.
52. Id. ¶ 40, 77 P.3d at 1099.
53. Id. ¶ 39, 77 P.3d at 1098.
1991, however, in Buzzard v. Farmers Insurance Co.45 the court was back to
describing bad faith as “intentional,” declaring that “[t]he knowledge and
belief of the insurer . . . is the focus of a bad faith claim.”46  Yet, in a final
twist, the court held that the insurer’s belief in a “general industry policy”47 to
justify its actions was not “reasonable” and therefore was formed in bad faith.48
The language in this line of cases fails to maintain any continuity.  By
including references to both intent and reasonableness while arbitrarily
alternating between a subjective and objective test, the court left attorneys on
both sides of the argument with room to maneuver — and itself with further
questions to answer.
D. Peters: Resurrection of Intent in Bad Faith?
Although the 2000 Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals case of Peters v.
American Income Life Insurance Co.49 failed to reach the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, the case presented an analysis that strongly contradicted the leanings of
Timmons and its progeny.  In Peters, the Court of Civil Appeals ruled that the
issue of bad faith should not have proceeded to the jury, finding that mere
negligence by an insurance company’s employee did not suffice to establish
a prima facie case for the tort.50  Rather, the majority opinion made clear that
“[b]ad faith and negligence are not synonymous.”51  Perhaps more importantly,
after citing both Christian and McCorkle for the basic proposition that liability
is predicated upon “unreasonable bad faith conduct,”52 the court highlighted
what it believed to be the crucial facts of these prior cases, noting that “[t]here,
elements of wilfulness, malice, and oppression entered into the circumstances.
The acts of the insurer were directed specifically toward the insured in an
effort to avoid responsibility and conceal facts.”53  Thus, the lingering effects
of Timmons and its rejection of a subjective, intent-focused version of bad
faith clearly failed to sway the Court of Civil Appeals.
Thus, the apparent trend leading up to the Badillo opinion was for the courts
to preserve at least some element of motive, purpose, or knowledge in the
requirements for bad faith.  Further, as shown in Peters, even where the court
continued to describe bad faith in terms of the “unreasonableness of the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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54. Id. ¶ 28, 77 P.3d at 1097.
55. Explaining the reasonable standard in light of the facts, the court emphasized that “no
evidence was presented tending to show that AIL delayed payment, tried to extort some unfair
advantage . . . or even just ignored the claim.”  Id. ¶ 36, 77 P.3d at 1098.
56. 2000 OK 18, 998 P.2d 1219.
57. Id. ¶ 16, 998 P.2d at 1223.  Here, the court cited Christian’s holding that “tort liability
arises only ‘where there is a clear showing that the insurer unreasonably, and in bad faith,
withholds payment of the claim of its insured.’”  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Christian v. Am.
Home Assurance Co., 1977 OK 141, ¶ 26, 577 P.2d 899, 905).
58. Skinner, ¶¶ 8, 13, 998 P.2d at 1221-22.  These passages demonstrate that Skinner first
filed a bad faith claim for John Deere’s unreasonable delay in making payment — and then
sought to amend this complaint to include Deere’s denial of a discovery request after Skinner
filed the petition as further evidence of bad faith.
59. Id. ¶ 2, 998 P.2d at 1220.
60. Id. ¶¶ 4, 5, 998 P.2d at 1221.
61. Id. ¶¶ 6, 11, 998 P.2d at 1221-22.
62. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
insurer’s actions,”54 the explanation provided in factual context suggested that
“reasonable” truly meant devoid of culpable intent.55
E. A Final Ingredient: Skinner’s Threshold Question
As the preceding cases demonstrate, a primary legal issue in Oklahoma bad
faith involves interpreting Christian’s holding with respect to the mental
culpability required for bad faith liability — whether negligence, specific
intent, or something in between.  Nevertheless, with its analysis in the 2000
opinion of Skinner v. John Deere Insurance Co.,56 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court cited Christian for the proposition that, before it would even consider
the presence of bad faith conduct, there must be evidence that the accused
insurer withheld payment of the insured’s claim.57
Skinner involved a bad faith claim against an insurer for failing to render
payment under an uninsured motorist (UM) and liability policy.58  When an
underinsured motorist hit the vehicle in which Kristie Skinner was a passenger,
Skinner sustained severe injuries, as did two other passengers.59  The
complicated facts giving rise to Skinner’s claim involved John Deere
Insurance’s eleven month delay in making payment while it sought both to
resolve a genuine legal question regarding the amount of the UM policy and
decide how to divide the claim among the disputing co-plaintiffs.60
Nevertheless, at least one component of Skinner’s bad faith claim consisted of
John Deere’s refusal to grant Skinner discovery of internal documents created
after a settlement offer was made and rejected.61  In response to Skinner’s
claim, the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied Christian’s holding that liability




64. McCorkle v. Great Atl. Ins. Co., 1981 OK 128, 637 P.2d 583.
65. Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 1982 OK 97, 653 P.2d 907.
66. Peters v. Am. Income Life Ins. Co., 2003 OK CIV APP 62, 77 P.3d 1090.
67. See Timmons, ¶ 8, 653 P.2d at 910 (discussing the various reasons the insurer presented
for not covering insured’s accident); McCorkle, ¶ 6, 637 P.2d at 584 (discussing the insurer’s
irrational lowering of the settlement offer); Christian, ¶ 3, 998 P.2d at 1220-21 (discussing the
insurer’s unjustified refusal to pay); Peters, ¶ 2, 77 P.3d at 1093 (reciting that the basis of the
claim was failure to render insurance proceeds).
68. Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 2005 OK 48, 121 P.3d 1080 (per curiam).
69. Id. ¶ 22, 121 P.3d at 1092.
70. Id. ¶ 4, 121 P.3d at 1088.
71. Id.
72. Id. ¶ 8, 121 P.3d at 1089.
the Skinner court ruled, John Deere’s refusal to allow discovery was irrelevant
to the question of bad faith because this occurred after offering payment.  In
other words, because John Deere offered payment up front, bad faith became
a legal impossibility. In the Supreme Court’s words, “the actions of an insurer
after payment is made cannot be the basis of the bad faith claim.”63
Perhaps because Christian itself, along with the benchmark cases of
McCorkle64 and Timmons65 and recent decisions such as Peters,66 all involved
situations where the insured’s complaint centered on the insurer’s failure to
pay,67 this issue has remained largely unaddressed outside of Skinner.  As the
following Parts III and IV demonstrate, however, Badillo once again raised the
relevance of the insurer’s willingness to offer policy proceeds as a bad faith
requirement.  Skinner, therefore, represents a final, critical  consideration in the
bad faith analysis.
III. Badillo v. Mid Century Insurance Co.
A. Introductory Facts
Badillo made its way to the Oklahoma Supreme Court on appeal from the
Oklahoma County district court.68  After the district court judge denied Mid
Century’s request for summary judgment on the issue of whether it had acted
in bad faith, a jury entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Mario Badillo.69
The particular grievance giving rise to Badillo’s claim against his insurer, Mid
Century, surrounded Mid Century’s failure to complete a settlement with a
third party who Badillo injured when he struck her with his vehicle.70  While
this third party, Loretta Smith, was bedridden, her sister and representative
hired counsel.71  Smith’s counsel contacted Mid Century, who in turn
conceded liability and tendered a check for the entire $10,000 limit of
Badillo’s liability policy.72  Nevertheless, whisperings from witnesses at the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
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73. Id. ¶ 10, 121 P.3d at 1089.
74. Id. ¶ 6, 121 P.3d at 1089.
75. Id. ¶ 12, 121 P.3d at 1090.
76. Id. ¶ 19, 121 P.3d 1091.
77. The court’s recital of the facts stated that following the judgment and a hearing on
Badillo’s assets, Smith’s attorney suggested to Badillo and his attorney that they sue Mid
Century.  In return, Smith agreed to postpone her attempts to collect on the judgment until after
this second stage of litigation.  Id. ¶ 21, 121 P.3d 1092.
78. Id. ¶ 20, 121 P.3d 1092.
79. The first of these reversals occurred with the Supreme Court’s first opinion, Badillo v.
Mid Century Ins. Co., 2004 OK 42, withdrawn, 2005 OK 48, 121 P.3d 1080, that reversed the
trial court’s ruling in favor of Badillo.  In addition, the court subsequently withdrew this opinion
on grant of rehearing and replaced it with the current opinion that effectively reinstated the jury
verdict and judgment against Mid Century.
80. OUJI 22.3, supra note 36; Badillo, ¶ 25, 121 P.3d at 1093.
scene of the accident that Badillo was driving erratically immediately prior to
striking Smith suggested to both sides that alcohol might have been
involved — potentially giving rise to a local tavern’s vicarious liability.73  This
scenario, coupled with the possibility of employer liability if Badillo happened
to be on the job when the accident occurred, led Smith’s attorneys to refuse
Mid Century’s offer and the accompanying release until Mid Century allowed
them to speak with Badillo.74
Claiming that it was concerned with exposing Badillo to possible criminal
charges associated with driving under the influence, Mid Century refused to
produce Badillo for a statement, without ever discussing with him either the
alcohol and employment issues or the final decision to refuse Smith’s
request.75  This refusal proved catastrophic for Badillo, leading to a breakdown
of Smith’s negotiations with Mid Century, a personal lawsuit against Badillo,
and an adverse judgment of over $600,000.76  Seeking to avoid bankruptcy,
and encouraged by Smith’s attorneys,77 Badillo filed suit against Mid Century,
claiming that it had acted in bad faith by needlessly preempting a settlement
within policy limits.78  The Oklahoma Supreme Court ultimately agreed.
B. Majority Reasoning
Undoubtedly striving for a decisive closure to a case that had already
suffered two reversals,79 the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued its opinion per
curiam.  The majority first noted that the starting place for bad faith liability
was OUJI 22.3 and its requirement that the insurer’s behavior be both
unreasonable under the circumstances and in violation of the duty to deal fairly
and in good faith.80  In determining the critical question of what behavior
amounts to a breach of this good faith duty, the court initially bypassed recent
caselaw for older, less familiar precedent.
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81. Badillo, ¶ 27, 121 P.3d at 1093 (citing Am. Fid. & Cas. Co. v. L.C. Jones Trucking Co.,
1957 OK 287, ¶ 2, 321 P.2d 685, 687).
82. Id. (citing Am. Fid. & Cas. Co. v. G.A. Nichols Co., 173 F.2d 830, 832 (10th Cir.
1949)).
83. Id. 
84. Id. ¶ 28 (quoting McCorkle v. Great Atl. Ins. Co., 1981 OK 128, ¶ 21, 637 P.2d 583,
587).
85. Id. ¶ 28, 121 P.3d at 1093-94 (citing Buzzard v. McDanel, 1987 OK 28, ¶ 7, 736 P.2d
157, 159).
86. Id.
87. Rhetorically, the court questioned, “[W]ould someone whose own financial health or
life was at stake have acted in the manner that insurers did?”  Id. ¶ 30, 121 P.3d at 1094.
88. Id. ¶ 29, 121 P.3d at 1094.
89. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
Citing Oklahoma cases from 1949 and 1957, an era decades before
Christian and its familiar framework, the court declared that the insurer must
behave as the insured’s “agent,”81 consistent with a “fiduciary capacity”
toward the insured.82  Consequently, the court deduced, the crux of bad faith
behavior in the context of an insurer dealing with a third party claimant is the
insurer’s failure to conduct settlement negotiations as if no policy limit
existed.83  Otherwise stated, to have avoided liability, Mid Century must have
dealt with Smith’s attorneys as if Badillo had an unlimited policy, or as if
Smith had sued Mid Century directly for the entirety of her injuries.
Nevertheless, one paragraph later the majority appeared to return to the
analysis of more recent bad faith cases, citing McCorkle for the proposition
that the essence of bad faith is the insurer’s “unreasonable, bad-faith
conduct.”84  The court continued by referencing Buzzard and its instruction
that “[a] central issue . . . is gauging whether the insurer had a good faith belief
in some justifiable reason for the actions it took or omitted . . . .”85  Grappling
with the same questions posed by Christian and its progeny regarding the
requisite culpability for bad faith, the court skirted the issue, defining it only
as “more than simple negligence, but less than the reckless conduct necessary
to sanction a punitive damage award . . . .”86
More importantly, the majority seemed to embrace a new concept of bad
faith centered on the “Golden Rule” of treating others as one would treat
themselves in the other’s position, adapted to the insurance context under the
notion that an insurer is the insured’s fiduciary and therefore must treat the
insured’s financial interests as synonymous with its own.87 Although Mid
Century argued that compliance with its express contractual duty to tender the
entire $10,000 policy insulated it against bad faith liability88 — undoubtedly
pursuant to Skinner’s holding that an offer to pay preempts bad faith89 — the
court refused to allow any one particular act or omission to dictate liability.
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Instead, the court endorsed a more holistic approach by stating that an
insurer’s ostensibly good actions will never dispose of a bad faith claim
“irrespective of other salient circumstances or considerations”90 that suggest
an insurer’s violation of the Golden Rule of treating the insured’s interest as
it would treat its own.91
Moreover, and perhaps most troubling to insurers, the majority borrowed
rules from such obscure sources as a 1963 and 1976 Wisconsin case to
emphasize that fulfilling the Golden Rule of meeting the “fiduciary” duty of
good faith included (1) the duty to inform the insured regarding settlement
offers, requests, and its implications,92 and (2) the duty to “seize a reasonable
opportunity” to settle when faced with “the potential for excess liability.”93
Clearly, the court was attempting to broaden the insurer’s responsibilities not
only beyond standards of past bad faith cases, but arguably beyond the sanctity
of the insurance contract itself.
C. Taylor’s Concurrence
Greatly extending the majority’s liberal perspective of bad faith, Justice
Taylor wrote separately to express his view that the implied promises,
reassuring slogans, and even the “soothing and comforting music” from
insurance advertisements “are part of the insurance contract” and implicate
corresponding performance in good faith.94  Further, the concurrence noted
that individuals purchase liability insurance for more than a check when
trouble strikes; they are purchasing the peace of mind that comes from being
assured, primarily through advertising, that the insurer will defend an adverse
lawsuit and negotiate its settlement on their behalf.95  Accordingly, the duty of
good faith should encompass the entire gamut of interaction with a hostile
third party who threatens the financial life of the insured.96  Garnering two
supporting votes that included the Chief Justice,97 Taylor’s concurrence
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indicates a strongly supported view of the insurer’s duty that could
dramatically influence future bad faith cases.
IV. Groundbreaking or Ungrounded? Badillo’s Contribution to Uncertainty
From an emotional standpoint, Mario Badillo’s complaint against his
insurer for exposing him to an enormous judgment and years of litigation by
a failure to communicate arguably deserved the Supreme Court’s finding of
insurer liability.  Moreover, this result appears to comport with the trend line
of the court’s precedent that suggested bad faith liability was appropriate
where the insurer’s actions were “subjectively unreasonable,” or demonstrating
a gross negligence that approached intentional wrongdoing.98  Despite the end
result, however, the Badillo court mishandled the issue of bad faith in three
specific ways.  First, the majority failed to directly address and distinguish
precedent that, if applied, could have arguably produced a different result.
Second, instead of presenting a clear, articulable standard to reflect its new
perspective on bad faith, the Badillo court offered an amorphous “Golden
Rule” for insurers to follow that requires them to figuratively place themselves
in the shoes of their policyholders during third party negotiations.  Although
perhaps morally laudable, this rule lacks a much needed explanation of the
specific mental culpability required for bad faith upon which previous
Oklahoma cases failed to agree.  Third, Badillo’s three-justice concurrence
suggested that future courts should abandon established rules of contract
interpretation and hold insurers contractually responsible for historically
irrelevant marketing enticements.  At a minimum, the concurrence’s approach
would jeopardize the predictability of how courts enforce the terms of
insurance policies.  The following three sub-parts address these shortcomings
separately.
A. The Elephant in the Room: Skinner v. John Deere99
The first flaw in the majority opinion was its failure to address and
distinguish Skinner, a case Justice Winchester of the dissent argued would
have unequivocally disposed of Badillo’s bad faith claim against Mid
Century.100  As noted above in Part II.E, Skinner appeared to establish a
threshold requirement for bad faith consisting of an insurer’s failure to offer
payment.  In the dissent’s view, this requirement was non-negotiable and
directly applicable to Badillo’s factual scenario.101  Accordingly, where Mid
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2006
196 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  59:183
102. Id. ¶ 29, 121 P.3d at 1094 (per curiam) (emphasis omitted).
103. Christian v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 1977 OK 141, ¶ 26, 577 P.2d 899, 905.
104. Id. ¶ 3, 577 P.2d at 900.  Here, the insured was injured on the job while covered by his
company’s group health insurance plan.  In response to the injury and claim, and after the
insured submitted proof of his disability, the insurer simply refused to pay for no articulable
reason.  Id.
105. The later U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit case of McCarty v. First of
Georgia Insurance Co., on appeal from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Oklahoma, reached a similar conclusion.  Specifically, the court noted that Christian’s
requirement of withholding a payment in bad faith was “simply emphasizing the obvious: if the
insured were not entitled to payment, a cause of action for wrongful denial of a claim could not
arise.”  713 F.2d 609, 612 (10th Cir. 1983).
Century upheld its end of the contractual bargain and tendered Badillo’s entire
policy amount to Loretta Smith, the trial court should have directed a verdict
for Mid Century.  In contrast to the dissent’s assertions, however, Skinner is
easily distinguishable from Badillo — raising the question as to why the
majority did not address the case more squarely.  
The Badillo majority, after briefly acknowledging the dissent’s insistence
that failure to pay is a dispositive element of bad faith, and without addressing
Skinner by name, simply stated that no Oklahoma case suggested that an
insurer’s offer to pay, “irrespective of other salient circumstances or
considerations,” precluded bad faith liability.102  However accurate this
conclusion might have been, the court nevertheless abdicated its responsibility
to specifically address Skinner, distinguish it from the Badillo scenario, and
provide the bad faith landscape some desperately needed clarification.  The
majority could have accomplished this in two ways.
First, the court could have limited Skinner to its facts because of Skinner’s
possible misinterpretation of Christian.  Specifically, Christian’s statement
that liability arises only where the insurer withholds payment in bad faith103
could simply mean that, when a failure to pay is the main component of the
insured’s claim, only a “bad faith” withholding gives rise to tort damages.
Such an interpretation of Christian’s reference to a failure to pay would be
logical because this constituted the insured’s principal complaint.104  This
failure, therefore, would naturally be the court’s primary focus when
explaining bad faith in the context of those particular facts.  By contrast, had
Christian dealt with a different scenario, the court might very well have
described liability in terms of a “bad faith” failure to negotiate, investigate, or
any other contractually required duty.105  Consequently, Skinner’s adoption of
the Christian language as the basis for its rule could arguably represent a
misguided holding with limited precedential value.
Second, even if Skinner rightfully interpreted Christian to have confined
bad faith to a failure to pay, Badillo contained facts that made the rule
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inapplicable.  In particular, Mid Century’s refusal to allow Smith’s attorneys
to interview Badillo effectively turned the original offer for $10,000 into a
non-offer.106  Because the facts indicated that Smith’s attorneys faced a
possible malpractice claim if they chose to accept the offer without
questioning Badillo and exploring further possible sources of liability —
namely an alcohol vendor or employer107 — Mid Century’s “take it or leave
it” approach to settlement made acceptance by Smith’s attorneys at least
impractical if not unethical.  As such, the Badillo majority could have
determined that payment was effectively “withheld” according to Skinner’s
interpretation of Christian that such withholding must accompany bad faith
liability, allowing the court to freely condemn Mid Century’s behavior without
appearing to sidestep controlling precedent.  Instead, the court bypassed a rare
opportunity to add structure to a highly amorphous body of law.
B. Deciphering the Badillo Standard for Bad Faith 
1. Reading Badillo as a Three-part Holding
Another troubling aspect of the court’s decision in Badillo is its choice to
define the already ambiguous term of bad faith with language that seems
equally uncertain.  Thirty years of prior case law focused on shifting bad faith
up and down the continuum between negligence and malice.108  Although this
debate proved contentious enough, Badillo inserted the idea that an insurer
must behave in a “fiduciary capacity” toward its insured109 — a term that
historically requires one to act solely in another’s best interest.110  Despite its
adoption of this new “Golden Rule,” sprinkled throughout the court’s opinion
are apparent attempts to maintain continuity with past opinions that evaluated
the insurer’s behavior against the traditional standards of negligence,
recklessness, and intent.111  With its puzzling mix of legal standards, Badillo
is arguably too confusing for practical use.  Nevertheless, the potential to
reconcile the court’s “Golden Rule” with the familiar, mental culpability rubric
does exist.
In assembling Badillo into a cohesive and functional analytical framework,
some independent analysis of the court’s references to fiduciary duties and
mental states is necessary.  First, courts use the term “fiduciary” in a myriad
of legal contexts, carrying with it various implications.  Generally, fiduciary
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duties arise out of two kinds of relationships: informal relationships, which
depend on confidence and trust, and formal agency relationships, where a
principal expressly authorizes an agent to act on its behalf.112  The typical
liability insurance contract illustrates this second relationship.  As a condition
of the insurer’s promise to cover damages caused by the insured, the insured
must grant the insurer the sole right to represent and defend the insured’s
interest in the event of a lawsuit.113  However formed, a fiduciary relationship
imposes on the fiduciary, at a minimum, the duty to give the beneficiary’s
interest at least as much weight as its own.114  Nevertheless, the question of
how a fiduciary breaches this duty in a manner that gives rise to tort liability
has multiple answers.  For example, a recent opinion has held that an
attorney’s breach of fiduciary duty is synonymous with attorney negligence.115
By contrast, in the corporate law setting involving an officer’s fiduciary duty
to the corporation’s shareholders, a breach can occur when the officer
appropriates corporate funds for personal use, even when the officer performs
the action in good faith.116  Still further, courts considering a real estate
broker’s fiduciary duty to its client have required behavior that amounts to
fraudulent or intentional conduct as a predicate to liability.117
These examples provide an important insight for evaluating Badillo —
namely, that courts routinely use the traditional measures of culpability when
analyzing a breach of a fiduciary duty.  Perhaps more accurately, courts view
the presence of a fiduciary duty as a notional umbrella, under which the
varying standards of culpability operate to determine liability.  Although the
Badillo court may have connected the proverbial dots poorly, one could read
the court’s various instructions as constituting a three-part holding:
(1) In the third party context, an insurer owes its insured a fiduciary duty to
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(2) Acting in the insured’s best interest encompasses (a) diligently
investigating the relevant facts to facilitate accurate negotiation with the third
party119 and (b) timely communication and consultation with the insured
regarding material communication from the third party, including settlement
offers.120
(3) A breach of this fiduciary duty that gives rise to liability requires
behavior from the insurer that (a) is not in the insured’s best interest and (b)
amounts to more than simple negligence but less than the reckless disregard
necessary for punitive damages.121
2. Interpreting Badillo’s Holding: A Return to the Mental Culpability
Debate
Even assuming the accuracy of the above interpretation of the court’s
ruling, Badillo’s biggest mystery remains unsolved.  Although its classification
of the insurer-insured relationship as a fiduciary relationship provides
important context, the court’s failure to narrow the requisite mental culpability
to a definable standard effectively renders the opinion unhelpful.  Practically,
what does “more than simple negligence, but less than the reckless conduct
[necessary for punitive damages]”122 mean?
Historically, culpability follows a four-step progression, increasing from
negligence through reckless disregard and intent to malice.123  Consequently,
the range in which Badillo places bad faith appears non-existent by
conventional understanding.  The court, however, noted that the reckless
disregard of which it spoke is limited to that giving rise to punitive damages —
that “from which malice and evil intent may be inferred.”124  By making this
distinction, the court arguably communicated its intent to leave traditional
recklessness available for defining bad faith.  According to the Restatement
Second of Torts, reckless disregard requires behavior that a reasonable person
should know would subject another to a risk of harm that is “substantially
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.”125
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Importantly, the phrase “risk of harm” has two components.  First,
recklessness is riskier than negligence.  It requires a danger that is “easily
perceptible”126 or has a “strong probability”127 to the reasonable person
standing in the tortfeasor’s shoes.  Second, recklessness is more harmful than
negligence, meaning that the potential consequences are of a greater
magnitude.  For example, where negligence might describe swinging a plastic
baseball bat, pointing a loaded gun implies reckless disregard — death or
serious injury being substantially more harmful than a stinging slap.
Notably, the particular facts emphasized by the Badillo majority suggest its
condemnation of Mid Century under a reckless disregard standard.  Above all,
the court appeared most troubled by the obviousness of the entire case.
According to testimony at trial, Mid Century had overwhelming reason to
know that its client’s case was a “code blue situation . . . involving probable
liability, catastrophic injuries and minimum coverage. . . . [It was a situation]
where insured’s financial life was at stake.”128  Moreover, the attorneys for
Smith, the injured third party, had expressly informed Mid Century that unless
Mid Century allowed them to speak with Badillo, they would reject any future
attempt by Mid Century to settle and would seek a judgment against Badillo
for the maximum amount possible.129  Consequently, when it refused this
request, Mid Century was in a position to know two critical facts that illustrate
the “risk” and “harm” components of recklessness: that its refusal created a
grave risk of an imminent lawsuit, and that this lawsuit would probably result
in tremendous harm to its insured in the form of a life-ruining judgment.
Simply stated, the Badillo majority failed to end the bad faith guessing
game.  What began as a novel, perhaps refreshing approach to bad faith with
an emphasis on the moralistic qualities of the “Golden Rule” and its
implication of fiduciary duties, concluded as merely feel-good language — a
result stemming from the court’s failure to anchor its abstract convictions to
the concrete practicalities of the mental culpability framework.  Nevertheless,
as explained above, careful parsing of the court’s language and an application
of legal inferences strongly suggests the following: that an insurer in the third
party context owes a fiduciary duty to its insured to refrain from acting in
reckless disregard of the insured’s financial interests.  However legally
grounded such an interpretation, only a future Oklahoma Supreme Court case
can affirmatively clarify Badillo’s ambiguities.
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C. Like a Good Neighbor, the Supreme Court Is There
In addition to its miscues regarding Skinner and its standard for bad faith,
Badillo contains language that threatens the predictability of written contracts
between insurers and insureds.  Moreover, Justice Taylor’s special
concurrence, which departs from traditional standards for evaluating the terms
of insurance contracts, has frightening evidentiary implications for insurance
defense attorneys attempting to preserve jury objectivity.
Importantly, early courts classified bad faith as a tort claim in order to
facilitate the punishment of behavior that did not necessarily amount to a
breach of contract.130  In addition, while commentators hail contracts as
ensuring predictable outcomes, torts deal in a more abstract realm.131
Assuming a case with undisputed facts, a breach of contract claim simply turns
on whether a defendant’s behavior amounted to a violation of the express
terms of a mutual agreement.132  By contrast, a tort claim in the same case
might engender rounds of debate over inherently ambiguous and shifting
concepts like “reasonableness,” granting that same defendant more room to
advocate and win the jury’s favor.133
This distinction proves absolutely critical in cases of insurance bad faith or
breach of a fiduciary duty.  So long as these wrongs remain confined to the tort
realm, insurers remain free to attack the claim from various angles, including
the often ambiguous standard for culpability and other elements such as
proximate cause.134  Nevertheless, once parties memorialize the principles of
fairness, honesty, and loyalty that comprise the duties of good faith into a
mutually agreed upon, expressly defined contract, an insurer’s attempt to
defend questionable behavior before a jury becomes a much more delicate and
difficult task.135  In other words, the fact that an insurer would sign a contract
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expressly admitting to these good faith obligations — rather than leave them
outside the contract and therefore, subject to dispute — would leave the
average juror with zero sympathy toward an allegedly disloyal or self-serving
insurer.
Effectively, Justice Taylor’s concurrence would impose this very scenario
on insurance companies who make “reassurances” through advertising136 —
treating an insurance company’s decision to advertise as if it had chosen to
pick up a pen and insert the substance of those advertisements into its
contracts as additional binding terms.  Specifically, Justice Taylor considered
the advertising slogan of Mid Century’s contemporary, State Farm Insurance,
which assures customers that “[l]ike a good neighbor, State Farm is there.”137
Consequently, the opinion suggested, insurers who advertise such promises
carry a contractual obligation to treat their insured’s “with car[e] and
neighborly concern.”138  As a further consequence, defense attorneys would no
longer be able to argue that television commercials were unduly prejudicial
and irrelevant to the question of bad faith.139  On the contrary, under Justice
Taylor’s rule, courts would admit such commercials as evidence that is equally
as sacred and consequential as any other term within the four corners of the
written insurance contract.
For any reader having survived a first year law course on contracts and the
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ungrounded.141  Nevertheless, Oklahoma legislation and decades of contract
case law make intuition unnecessary.  In particular, title 15, section 137 of the
Oklahoma Statutes expressly forbids the consideration of all “oral negotiations
or stipulations” outside a written contract when construing its terms.142
Moreover, sections 155 and 151 emphasize that the “writing alone”143
determines the parties’ intent and that “[a]ll contracts”144 — even those for
insurance — are subject to these evidentiary rules of exclusion.  Notably, even
the Oklahoma Supreme Court has pledged never to “rewrite terms” of
insurance contracts based on assumptions that the parties never reduced to
writing.145  In short, Justice Taylor’s concurrence ignored the time-honored
and legislatively mandated principles that preserve contracts as tools of
efficiency and certainty.  Absent a future, more historically rooted
justification, including advertising as terms of the insurance contract represents
a novel suggestion at best, but judicial lawmaking at worst.
V. Conclusion
In a field of law where the stakes are high and the legal fees higher,146
Badillo v. Mid Century Insurance Co. provided the firestorm of debate
surrounding bad faith with plenty of fuel.  Holding that insurers must follow
the “Golden Rule” of meeting a fiduciary duty to place themselves in the shoes
of their insureds when negotiating with third parties to the insurance contract,
Badillo created a new bad faith standard that will arguably cast future litigants
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into disarray for its lack of guidance on practical application.  Moreover,
Badillo invited additional criticism by both its majority opinion’s failure to
address and distinguish apparently governing caselaw, and by a three-judge
concurrence that foreshadowed a future intent to break with traditional contract
rules and hold insurance companies contractually liable for advertising
assurances.
Despite these shortcomings, however, Badillo’s core ruling — that an
insurer acts in bad faith when its unjustifiable failure to communicate with its
insured during third party settlement negotiations results in a failed settlement
and unnecessary lawsuit — is a ruling that both reflects sound policy and is
consistent with Oklahoma bad faith law that has historically associated bad
faith liability with an insurer’s grossly negligent or reckless behavior.
Consequently, Badillo represents that peculiar breed of cases that
simultaneously represent judicial successes in light of their fact-specific
outcomes, and judicial failures because of their analytical flaws that make for
puzzling precedent.  Far from certain, Badillo likely represents only the
beginning of a new quest to capture the true meaning of Oklahoma bad faith.
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